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APPROPRIATION BY THE STATE OF
MINIMUM FLOWS IN NEW MEXICO STREAMS

In 1973, the National Water Commission reported the following:
The water law systems of most of the States, both in the East and

the West, are deficient in that they fail to give appropriate recognition to social values of water. These values arise primarily from such
instream uses as fish and wildlife propagation, recreation, and aes-

thetics. The appropriation law of the Western States generally requires diversion of water from the stream or lake and its application
to beneficial use in order for a water right to be created. Instream
values are thus heavily discounted; water has been diverted from
streams to such an extent that instream values which should have
been protected frequently have been impaired, and sometimes destroyed .... [WIhere the action can be taken without impairing
vested rights, State officials should be authorized to set minimum
streamflows and lake levels to protect in situ values. 1
It is the purpose of this comment to canvass the nonfederal alternatives for accomplishing these goals.
States may be divided into four groups according to the system of
water law under which they operate.2 Some use the pure prior
appropriation, or "Colorado," doctrine. 3 Others, mostly those east
of the Mississippi River, use the pure riparian system. In between fall
two hybrid, "California" doctrine, groups. In one, some existing
rights were established under the riparian doctrine, but all new rights
must be created under the prior appropriation system. 4 In the other,
although most new rights are appropriative, there is some possibility
for the creation of new riparian rights.5
New Mexico is a member of the first group. Requirements for
creation of a water right in this state, as formulated by an authoritative commentator on prior appropriation law, are:
an intent to appropriate, notice of the appropriation, compliance
with state laws, a diversion of the water from a natural stream, and
1. National Water Commission, New Directions in U.S. Water Policy 63 (1973).
2. F. Trelease, Cases and Materials on Water Law 11-12 (2d ed. 1974).
3. Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and
Wyoming.
4. Kansas, Mississippi, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, and
Washington.
5. California and Nebraska.
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its application, with reasonable diligence and within a reasonable
time, to a beneficial use. 6

This formulation and quotation at the beginning of this article raise
two questions: Can the diversion requirement be reconciled with
maintenance of instream flows? And is the maintenance of an instream flow a beneficial use? These questions are crucial when an
appropriation is to be made. There are alternatives, however, to
appropriation, even in a prior appropriation state.
ALTERNATIVES TO APPROPRIATION
Waters can be withdrawn from appropriation, essentially taking
them out of the system at certain points. This is how Oregon has
preserved the flow of its streams for recreational and scenic purposes
for more than a half century. 7 It is an attractive approach to the
problem because it sidesteps the requirements of prior appropriation,
including diversion, forfeiture, and abandonment. It is impossible to
use this approach in New Mexico, however, unless the state constitution is amended. Article 16, Section 2 of the constitution reads:
The unappropriated water of every natural stream, perennial or
torrential, within the state of New Mexico, is hereby declared to
belong to the public and to be subject to appropriation for beneficial
use, in accordance with the laws of the state. Priority of appropria-

tion shall give the better right.

This provision appears to create a right in individuals to appropriate
any waters not already appropriated. Thus, any attempt by the legislature to withdraw waters from appropriation could be successfully
challenged as in violation of this provision. The Oregon legislature
did not have to leap this constitutional hurdle.
Montana has sought to achieve the same objective by "reserving"
waters, 8 and Washington has phrased its statutes in terms of "establishment of a minimum flow" which is not to be appropriated. 9
6. Trelease, supra note 2, at 37.
7. Ore. Rev. Stat. § § 538.110 to .300 (Repl. 1973). The proposal made here for this
state's streams could be usefully applied to lakes as well.
8. The state or any political subdivision or agency thereof, or the United States
or any agency thereof, may apply to the board [of natural resources and
conservation] to reserve waters for existing or future beneficial uses, or to
maintain a minimum flow, level, or quality of water throughout the year or at
such periods or for such length of time as the board designates.
Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §89-890 (Supp. 1974).
9. The department of water resources may establish minimum water flows or
levels for streams, lakes or other public waters for the purposes of protecting
fish, game, birds or other wildlife resources, or recreational or aesthetic values
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Although the words differ slightly, they achieve the same effect in
the same way that Oregon's "withdrawal" of water from appropriation does. The essence of the process is removing certain waters
from the substantive and procedural requirements of the prior
appropriation regime. Thus, the phraseologies employed by the latter
two states would also run afoul of Article 16, Section 2 of the New
Mexico Constitution.
The waters of New Mexico streams are nearly fully appropriated.
Indeed, at the time the Rio Grande Compact of 1938 was negotiated,
the Rio Grande was already fully appropriated within the state.' 0
What can be done in areas where there is nothing left to be appropriated? One possibility is to deny applications for new uses and
restrict changes in present uses that would adversely affect instream
flows still existing. Changes in use take the form of reduction of
return flows and changes in points of diversion and points of return
flow. Utah, for instance, has given its state engineer express authority
to deny applications which "unreasonably affect public use or the
natural stream environment."' '
The New Mexico state engineer would seem already to have the
power to deny applications for the purpose of preserving instream
flows. Section 75-5-6 of the New Mexico statutes empowers him to
do the following:
[The state engineer] may also refuse to consider or approve any

application .. if, in his opinion, approval thereof would be contrary
to the public interest.' 2
Only once has the New Mexico Supreme Court been called upon to
interpret how much latitude is -allowed the state engineer under the
public interest clause. In the 1910 case of Young & Norton v.
Hinderlider' ' the Court rejected a narrow reading of the clause
which would have limited its application to projects which endanger
the public health or safety. The Court has never struck down a use of
the power. Nevertheless, the state engineer, like his counterparts in
other states,1 4 has never used the power to preserve instream flows
of said public waters whenever it appears to be in the public interest to
establish the same.
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 90.22.010 (Supp. 1974).
10. See Hill, Development of the Rio Grande Compact of 1938, 14 Nat. Res. J.163, 187

(1974).
11. Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-8 (1975 Supp.). See also § 73-3-29(3) (1975 Supp.).
12. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-5-6 (Repl. 1968).
13. 15 N.M. 666, 110 P. 1045 (1910).
14. Robie, Modernizing State Water Rights Laws: Some Suggestions for New Directions,
1974 Utah L. Rev. 760, 765 and n.48. The author is the Director of the California State
Water Resources Control Board.

NA TURAL RESOURCES JOUR NA L

[Vol. 15

or for any other purpose. s Even if the state engineer were willing to
exercise this power, two questions would have to be answered.
Would its exercise for the purpose of maintaining instream flows be
constitutional? And if so, is it the best method for preserving such
flows?
Article 16, Section 2 declares that all unappropriated water shall
be available for appropriation to beneficial use. It first appears that
this section might be violated by refusal to allow appropriation of
unappropriated water for the purpose of maintaining the riparian
habitat in a section of a stream. However, the same constitutional
section contains the statement that the water "is hereby declared to
belong to the public." The Supreme Court recognized this in the
Young & Norton case and emphasized the impact of this public
ownership. 1 6 It is fundamental that the right to use water is a
usufructuary right to be exercised consistently with the public good.
Can the state engineer also deny applications in the public interest
where a present water user with a valid vested appropriation seeks to
change his use or his point of diversion? ' Conspicuously missing
from the section 1 8 requiring approval of the state engineer for such
changes is the express power to deny applications because they are
"contrary to the public interest." It is plausible, nevertheless, that a
court would find that the public interest standard is inherent in all
duties of the state engineer in view of the words of the constitution,1 I the first section of the water code,' 0 and the section governing applications for new rights.2 1 Again, the usufructuary nature of
water rights is paramount. There must, however, be a balancing
between the public interest and private property rights. The owner of
a vested water right is in a stronger position than one who is applying
for such a right. Indeed, the Court has said that "a water right is a
property right and inherent therein is the right to change the place of
diversion, storage, or use of the water if the rights of other water
15. Telephone interview with Paul Bloom, Counsel to the State Engineer, in Santa Fe,
New Mexico, on Sept. 17, 1975.
16. 15 N.M. at 677, 110 P. at 1050.
17. The deleterious effect that a change in the point of diversion can have on instream
flows is illustrated by the protests of the Forest Service to the transfer of water rights from
points downstream of a part of the national forest to a point upstream. The Forest Service
complained that during periods of low flow the upstream diversions might "severely impair
and perhaps eliminate this necessary flow." Letter from William D. Hurst, Regional
Forester, Southwestern Region, U.S. Forest Service, to the N.M. State Engineer, June 18,
1973 (on file at the Forest Service in Albuquerque).
18. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-5-23 (Repl. 1968).
19. N.M. Const. art. 16, § 2.
20. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-1-1 (Repl. 1968).
21. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-5-6 (Repl. 1968).
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users will not be injured thereby." 2"2 Thus, it would seem that at
least statutory authority for denying applications to make changes in
water rights would be necessary. There is also the possibility that to
deny a change would violate the takings clauses of the state and
federal constitutions if done without compensation to the rightholder.2

3

Aside from statutory and constitutional difficulties, the method
under discussion is inferior to straightforward appropriation by the
state. It is inferior because (1) it provides no notice to the holder or
seeker of a right that the application to the state engineer will be
denied for the purpose of maintaining instream flows;2 4 besides
being unfair, time and money devoted to preparing the application
will be lost unnecessarily; (2) there is no orderly quantification of
the proper amount of water to be reserved for minimum flow; (3)
such a case-by-case approach where the instream values are balanced
against specific projects would result in obfuscation of the general
public policy at stake;2 ' (4) it is difficult to deny applications upon
which considerable sums of money have already been expended; and
(5) success depends crucially on the degree to which any particular
state engineer is sensitive to the values protected by preserving
instream flows.
Two other methods of preserving instream flows will not be considered here. They are the federal reserved water rights2 6 and the
navigation servitude.2 I

APPROPRIATION UNDER SPECIAL LEGISLATION
Superior to all methods of preserving minimum flows previously
discussed is appropriation of such flows by the state. Unlike the
federal methods and use of the public interest standard for limiting
appropriations, this approach fits neatly into the existing state regulatory regime and thus provides other appropriators with all the
safeguards and rights inherent in the statutory scheme.
22. Clodfelter v. Reynolds, 68 N.M. 61, 66, 358 P.2d 626, 629 (1961), quoting from
Lindsey v. McClure, 136 F.2d 65, 69 (10th Cir. 1943).
23. U.S. Const. amend. V, N.M. Const. art. 2, § 20.
24. Robie, supra note 14, at 770.

25. Id.
26. See Robie, supra note 14, at 771; National Water Commission, Water Policies for the
Future 464-68 (1973). The federal government is presently asserting claims to the waters of
the Red River in northern New Mexico reserved under the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act and
under executive orders creating national forests. See Complaint in Intervention, State ex rel.
Reynolds v. Molybdenum Corp., Civil No. 9780 (D.N.M. filed Nov. 2, 1972).
27. See Morreale, Federal Power in Western Waters: The Navigation Power and the Rule
of No Compensation, 3 Nat. Res. J. 1 (1963); National Water Commission, Water Policies
for the Future 468-69 (1971).
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It is submitted that minimum flows can best be preserved in New
Mexico streams through enactment of special legislation. This legislation would define beneficial use, abrogate the diversion requirement, and establish an independent state commission which would
appropriate instream flows up to the minimum necessary to sustain
natural riparian habitat and compatible recreation. These appropriations would benefit from the normal safeguards given water rights,
particularly those against impairment through change in use of point
of diversion by senior appropriators.
Under the law of the New Mexico, recreation is already a beneficial use of water.2 8 The proposed act would further define "beneficial use" to include maintenance of the riparian environment to
support wildlife that has or will depend on it, whether permanent or
migratory, and preservation for educational, historic, scientific,
scenic, aesthetic and other similar public uses.
It seems clear that the legislature has the power to define the term
"beneficial use" which appears in Sections 2 and 3 of Article 16 of
the state constitution.2 Many other states have done it.3 The
judiciary has been doing it throughout the history of the prior appropriation doctrine in the western states. In addition, Section 2 contains the proviso, "in accordance with the laws of the state." Until
enactment of the comprehensive water code in 1907"1 water rights
had been administered through litigation in the courts, and that is
where the rules of law had been developed and refined. The language
of Article 16, Section 2, adopted four years after the code, seems to
affirm the new role the legislature was shaping for itself as public
policymaker in the field of water law.
The definition of "beneficial use" is central to proper allocation of
water resources. The definition should be adjusted from time to time
to meet the needs of society. The legislature is the primary policymaking organ in the state, and it would be unwise to exclude it from
the process of determining how water should be allocated. It is both
consistent with the state constitution and sound water resource
administration that the legislature be able to define "beneficial use."
As pointed out initially, a major stumbling block to appropriation
of instream flows is the requirement of a diversion in order to estab28. State ex reL State Game Comm'n v. Red River Valley Co., 51 N.M. 207, 218, 182
P.2d 421, 428 (1947).
29. Section 3 provides: "Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the limit of
the right to the use of water."
30. E.g., Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 89-867 (1974 Supp.); Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 90.54.020(1) (1974 Supp.).
31. Ch. 49 119071 N.M. Laws71.
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lish the right. This obstacle presents itself in two contexts: (1) it is
necessary for a legally effective appropriation of the instream flow
itself, and (2) it requires an appropriator to remove water from the
stream even when the use to which it is to be put does not require
that it be removed, thus depriving the stream unnecessarily of some
of the flow that would otherwise be present. It is the first of these
which is of primary concern here.
Colorado's experience with the diversion requirement provides
graphic illustration of the need to deal explicitly with the requirement. The Colorado legislature had given the state's Colorado River
Conservation District the power to "file upon and hold for the use of
the public sufficient water of any natural stream to maintain a constant stream flow in the amount necessary to preserve fish." 3 2 But
when the district sought to exercise this power, denial of the claim
was affirmed by the Colorado Supreme Court because no appropriation could be valid without a diversion from the stream. 3 Subsequently, the state legislature remedied the situation by removing the
diversion requirement from the statute.3 4
New Mexico has a somewhat similar situation. In the case of State
ex rel. Reynolds v. Miranda,3" the New Mexico Supreme Court
denied an alleged appropriation for lack of a physical diversion.
Lorenzo Miranda claimed a right to follow his diminishing surface
water supply to its source by drilling a well. He and his predecessors
claimed to have used, since before 1907, the water flowing intermittently down an arroyo to irrigate grass growing in the bed of the
arroyo. He let his cattle graze on the grass in the warmer months and
cut and stored the grass for winter use. The Court concluded:
We hold that man-made diversion, together with intent to apply
water to beneficial use and actual application of the water to beneficial use, is necessary to claim water
rights by appropriation in New
3 6
Mexico for agricultural purposes.

In light of the foregoing it is imperative that the proposed legislation
include a provision abrogating the diversion requirement. The ques32. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 37-46-107(1)0) (1973). See also § § 3747-107(1)0) &
37-48-105(1)0).
33. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Rocky Mountain Power Co., 158 Colo.

331, 406 P.2d 798 (1965). See Ellis, Recreational Uses for Water Under PriorAppropriation
Law, 6 Nat. Res. J. 181 (1966).
34. Ch.442, § 1 [1973] Colo. Laws 1521.
35. 83 N.M. 443, 493 P.2d 409 (1972), noted in 13 Nat. Res. J. 170 (1973).
36. 83 N.M. at 445, 493 P.2d at 411.
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tion again arises, however, whether such abrogation would be constitutionally permissible.'
Article 16, Section 2 of the New Mexico Constitution clearly
makes prior appropriation a constitutional doctrine. It cannot, therefore, be abrogated except by amtnding the constitution. From this
axiom we may extract the rule that no essential part of that doctrine,
e.g., the element of diversion, may be changed by an act of the
legislature. Applying a familiar mode of constitutional interpretation,3 the problem then is to determine what the framers of the
New Mexico Constitution meant by the phrase "appropriation for
beneficial use." The Supreme Court has said that this provision of
the constitution was only "declaratory of existing law." 3" What,
then, was the existing law? About the time the constitution was
adopted the Supreme Court of the United States handed down the
decision of Schodde v, Twin Falls Land & Water Co.,4" which purported to describe the right of an appropriator to instream flows
under the law of Idaho, a pure prior appropriation state. The Colorado Supreme Court cited the Schodde case for the proposition that
"the right to the maintenance of the 'flow' of a stream is a riparian
right and is completely inconsistent with the doctrine of prior appropriation." 4 1 If the New Mexico Supreme Court were to approve this
strong language, it might well be forced to declare the Act unconstitutional under Article 16, Section 2.
The argument made earlier in favor of the legislature's power to
define "beneficial use" applies to the diversion requirement in most
respects. It applies more strongly here because the constitution does
not even mention the necessity of diversion, whereas it devotes a
separate section to the requirement of beneficial use.4" It is also
true, however, that what the proposed legislation would do in this
area is not merely define an admitted requirement, but abolish
altogether what has been assumed to be a requirement. The argument
37. There has been some difference of opinion on this point. It was stated that the
legislature could do so in Comment, Constitutional Revision-Water Rights, 9 Nat. Res. J.
471, 479 (1969). No authority was cited for the statement, however. Although the question
was not expressly taken up, the Constitutional Revision Commission implied the opposite.
Report of the [New Mexico] Constitutional Revision Comm'n 187 (1967).
38. See, e.g., the analysis by which the content of the jury trial requirement of the Sixth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was determined. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S.
276, 288 (1930).
39. State ex reL State Game Comm'n v. Red River Valley Co., 51 N.M. 207, 217, 182
P.2d 421, 427 (1947).
40. 224 U.S. 107 (1912).
41. Colorado River Conservation Dist. v. Rocky Mountain Power Co., 158 Colo. 331,
333, 406 P.2d 798, 800 (1965).
42. See N.M. Const. art. 16.
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would seem to be that it is permissible for the legislature to assist in
the definition of "beneficial use," but it would not be permissible to
eliminate the beneficial use requirement altogether, which is proposed with respect to the diversion requirement. This reasoning is
persuasive, but it suffers from one flaw: the concept of beneficial use
is fundamental to the doctrine of prior appropriation, whereas diversion is not.4
The conclusion that diversion is not essential to accomplish the
purposes of prior appropriation is reached by analyzing the necessities and policies which originally underlay that requirement. The
diversion requirement serves three purposes. First, it provides objective proof of intent to appropriate. Its utility in this regard is amply
illustrated by the Miranda case. Justice Montoya's opinion for the
Court reveals that the reason for holding that a diversion is required
for agricultural purposes is the necessity of providing objective
evidence of the intent to appropriate. 4 The priority asserted in
Miranda antedated enactment of the Water Code. Since adoption of
the Code, evidence of intent is satisfied by filing notice of intent to
appropriate with the state engineer or by obtaining a permit to
appropriate from the state engineer.4 If the would-be appropriator
does not consummate the appropriation by applying the water to a
beneficial use within a reasonable time, the permit will lapse and no
license will be issued because the permittee has not shown sufficient
intent and ability to appropriate. 4 6 Thus, the former objectiveevidence-of-intent purpose of diversion is accomplished by other
means for rights initiated after 1907.
Second, diversion was a practical kind of notice to others on the
stream that a water right was being asserted. 4 This purpose, too, is
accomplished by routine procedures under the Water Code. Since
1907 every new appropriation has required approval of the state
engineer.4 One of the chief functions of the state engineer is to
43. See generally Comment, Water Appropriation for Recreation, I Land & Water L.
Rev. 209 (1966); Comment, The Prerequisiteof a Man-Made Decision in the Appropriation
of Water Rights-State ex rel Reynolds v. Miranda, 13 Nat. Res. J. 170 (1973).
44. 83 N.M. at 445, 493 P.2d at 411.
45. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-5-1 (Repl. 1968). See Pueblo of Isleta v. Tondre, 18 N.M. 388,
137 P. 86 (1913).
46. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-5-5, & -7 (Repl. 1968) set out the maximum times. Section
75-5-7 allows additional time where delay has been caused by "acts of God, operation of
law, or other causes beyond the control of the applicant." The implication is that as long as
the applicant has the intent and ability under normal conditions to apply the water to
beneficial use, the time will be extended. This is a codification of the doctrine of relation
back.
47. See Millheiser v. Long, 10 N.M. 99, 106-07, 61 P. 111, 113-114 (1900).
48. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-5-1 (Repl. 1968).
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limit appropriations to the amount of water available on a stream.
Thus, the purpose of notice is fully served when the state engineer
refuses to issue a permit for the amount requested by the applicant.
Third, as has been pointed out elsewhere, 4 diversions have been
required on the assumption that dedication of water to uses which
require diversions would result in better allocation of resources.
However, the changing values and needs of society have eroded this
assumption, as is amply demonstrated by the list of beneficial uses
provided for in the proposed legislation. Most importantly, it seems
fitting, in view of today's highly developed forms of water administration, that the optimum allocation of water be achieved through
refinement of the term "beneficial use" and not through partial
reliance on the blunt tool of the diversion requirement.
On the basis of the foregoing discussion it is concluded that a
constitutional amendment is not necessary to abrogate the diversion
requirement.
The commission which would be created under the proposed legislation will be referred to as the Instream Flow Commission. The
commission would be given the following functions: (1) determining
the minimum flow for each watercourse for each month of the year,
(2) determining to what extent instream flows presently exist, (3)
appropriating in trust for the people of the state' 0 all unappropriated waters up to the minimum flow, (4) periodic review of the
availability of flows necessary to bring appropriations up to the
minimum flow, (5) monitoring enforcement measures of the state
engineer necessary to maintain the appropriated flows, and (6)
protestings 1 applications for new water rights or changes in existing
rights that will impair rights held by the commission. The commission would be required to follow all normal procedures under the
water code for establishing and protecting water rights. The determination of minimum flows would be made separately at public
meetings after notice to the public and opportunity to comment, and
determinations would be subject to judicial review for support by
substantial evidence. These procedural safeguards are important
because it is at this stage of the process that a limit is put on the
appropriations the commission may make.
The priority of appropriations under the proposed act would be
the dates on which the Instream Flow Commission files notice of
49. Tarlock, Preservationof Scenic Rivers, 55 Ky. L. J. 745, 760 (1967).
50. Under Idaho Code § § 67-4301 to -4312 (1975 Supp.) the Governor is empowered
to appropriate the waters of certain lakes "in trust" for the people of the state.
51. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-5-4.1 (Repl. 1968).
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intent to appropriate with the state engineer.' 2 The commission
would be required to file this notice immediately after its creation,
and the state engineer would allow a reasonable time within which
applications for permits would have to be filed. " The normal procedure for obtaining approval of permits, including notice, opportunity to protest, hearing, and appeal," ' would then be followed. The
state engineer would consider the application in accordance with
normal criteria.5 " Once a permit was approved, however, the state
engineer would be required to issue a license for the same water
automatically since there would be no works to be constructed in
order to perfect the right.5 6 The commission's determination of
minimum flows subject to the foregoing procedures and judicial
review would be conclusive and could not be questioned in the
permit proceedings. The state engineer would still have power under
the public interest clause to deny permit applications in exceptional
cases.
Like the other tenets of prior appropriation, the doctrines of forfeiture and abandonment should apply to appropriations made by
the Instream Flow Commission. Generally, failure to use water
beneficially results in loss of the right. If the rightholder intentionally fails to use the water he is held to have abandoned the
right.5s If he fails to use it for four years plus, is given notice and
declaration of nonuse by the state engineer, and fails to use it for one
more year, the right is forfeited no matter what the rightholder's
intent or motive was.5 I Forfeiture will not necessarily be held to
have occurred, however, "if circumstances beyond the control of the
owner have caused nonuse, such that the water could not be placed
to beneficial use by diligent efforts of the owner." 5 9 Thus, it has
been held that shortage of water is a sufficient excuse for nonuse. 6 0
However, in the recent South Springs case 6' the high court said in
dicta that the rightholder should have pursued his water to its source,
if possible, including the drilling of wells to replace surface waters
52. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-5-1 (Repl. 1968). The early priority asserted by the District in
Colorado River Conservation Dist. v. Rocky Mountain Power Co. has been correctly criticized in Ellis, supra note 33, at 184.
53. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-5-1 (Repl. 1968).
54. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 75-5-4, -4.1, -5 (Repl. 1968).
55. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-5-6 (Repl. 1968).
56. See N.9. Stat. Ann. § § 75-5-5 & -7 (Repl. 1968).
57. State ex reL Reynolds v. South Springs Co., 80 N.M. 144, 452 P.2d 478 (1969).
58. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-5-26(A) (Repl. 1968).
59. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-5-26(A) (Repi. 1968).
60. Chavez v. Gutierrez, 54 N.M. 76, 213 P.2d 597 (1950).
61. 80 N.M. 144, 452 P.2d 478 (1969).
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which had been appropriated before the water table declined and the
surface flow ceased.6 2
A water right can also be forfeited, even if the water is being used
beneficially and with the requisite intent, if the use is illegal, such as
diverting water at a new location without obtaining a permit from
the state engineer to change the point of diversion. 6 ' The Supreme
Court has said that "forfeiture is a 'punishment annexed by law to
some illegal act.' "6 4
The question here is in what situations the Instream Flow Commission could be found to have failed beneficially to use water under
its appropriations. It is possible that a situation similar to that in the
South Springs case will arise, where a naturally declining water table
causes surface flows to disappear. Should the right of the commission
to instream flows then be held to cease unless it drills wells and
pumps water into the streambed? Clearly it should be held to the
same standard as other appropriations. If the instream flow appears
to have disappeared permanently for natural reasons, the commission
would have to determine whether there is a riparian habitat valuable
enough to justify replacing the waters. If it decides to take no action
to replace the water, it should be found to have abandoned or forfeited the right. If the water table declines and causes the surface
flow to disappear, due to appropriations of ground water or surface
water in the stream systems, the commission should be held to have
abandoned the water right by reason of its failure to protest the
applications for such rights with the state engineer at the time of
application. The commission would have to be vigilant to protect
against impairment of its rights through other appropriations or
changes in existing uses.
What about a period of drought after which normal flows will
return to the stream? In this situation the commission should normally not be held to have abandoned or forfeited its rights. This
result is consonant with present law. Abandonment depends on the
intent of the rightholder. The intent may be either express or
62. Id.at 149, 452 P.2d at 482.
63. State ex reL Reynolds v. Fanning, 68 N.M. 313, 361 P.2d 721 (1961). Forfeiture for
failure to comply with state law other than a failure to use beneficially does not appear to
be covered by the forfeiture statute, § 75-5-26. Thus, the special notice feature of that
provision would also seem to be inapplicable. See generally State ex rel. Reynolds v.
Fanning, supra; State ex rel. Reynolds v. Mitchell, 66 N.M. 212, 345 P.2d 744 (1959); State
ex tel.
Bliss v. Dority, 55 N.M. 12, 225 P.2d 1007 (1950).
64. State ex rel.
Reynolds v. South Springs Co., 80 N.M. 144, 147, 452 P.2d 478, 481
(1969), quoting from, State ex rel. Erickson v. McLean, 62 N.M. 264, 272, 308 P.2d 983,
988 (1957) (emphasis supplied here), which quoted from 2 Kinney on Irrigation and Water
Rights § 1118 (2d ed. 1912).
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implied. 6" In this case intent would have to be inferred from nonuse,
that is, lack of water in the streambed. According to the South
Springs case, this nonuse would have to continue for an "unreasonable period" in order to create a presumption of intent to abandon.6 6 The effect of the drought on the riparian habitat would also
be relevant. If the habitat will be destroyed by the drought without
hope of revival, then, absent any stopgap measures by the commission to preserve the habitat, the commission should be found to have
abandoned the right.
APPROPRIATION UNDER CURRENT LAW
It is submitted that even if the proposed legislation is not adopted
it is possible for the State Department of Game and Fish, the Sierra
Club, or a private individual, to appropriate instream flows. First,
Section 75-5-1 allows acquisition of water rights by "[a] ny person,
association, or corporation, public or private, the state of New
Mexico, or the United States of America." Second, recreation has
been held to be a beneficial use.6 7 The foregoing proposed beneficial
uses have never been rejected by the New Mexico courts, and many
of the proposed uses can be achieved through appropriations for
recreation. Third, diversion will in all likelihood not be required. This
may sound surprising in view of what has been said before. This
conclusion is reached, however, by going back to the Miranda
decision and comparing it with the policies underlying the diversion
requirement. Although the Miranda decision has been criticized by
one commentator, 6 it is submitted that (1) the decision in that case
was correct and (2) that an appropriation made at the present time
to maintain instream flows would not be subject to the diversion
requirement set out in that case. The Miranda case involved water
rights allegedly initiated before enactment of the state water code in
1907.69 The traditional policies of providing objective evidence of
intent to appropriate, notice, and optimal water resource allocation,
which underlie the diversion requirement, all apply squarely to
appropriations initiated before 1907. Thus, the decision is correct.
Those policies have been otherwise satisfied only since the advent of
comprehensive administrative water management. Therefore, despite
65. Id.
66. Id. at 146, 452 P.2d at 480.
67. State ex reL State Game Comm'n v. Red River Valley Co., 51 N.M. 207, 218, 182
P.2d 421, 428 (1947).
68. 13 Nat. Res. J. 170 (1973).
69. 83 N.M. at 444, 493 P.2d at 410.
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the Court's broad language in Miranda, that holding should not be
extended to any appropriations initiated after 1907.11
Appropriation of instream flows without benefit of the special
legislation proposed is not the recommended solution, however. It
would result in hit-and-miss appropriation without the benefit of an
overall plan or the scientific and engineering expertise available under
the legislative scheme. But it is the only solution if the legislature
fails to act.
JOHN B. DRAPER

70. This analysis also answers the question whether the abrogation of the diversion
requirement in the proposed statute should be limited to appropriations made under the act.
The abrogation may safely be applied to all appropriations being made under the 1907
water code. Across-the-board abrogation has the collateral advantage in this context of
allowing appropriators whose water use does not inherently require diversion to allow the
water to remain in the stream.

